The creation of a new CFPA is a very bad idea and should be rejected. Nor can the proposal be made tolerable with a few minor tweaks-it is not salvageable and it cannot be improved in substance or in form to be any less of a menace to American consumers and the American economy. It is premised on a fundamental misunderstanding of the causes of the financial crisis: indeed, the Obama Administration's Financial Regulatory Reform White Paper offers no evidence-noneto support any of its claims that a meaningful cause of the financial crisis were the result of consumers' inability to understand innovative financial products or that the existence of the CFPA would have or could have averted the financial crisis. Let me repeat that to make clear-there is no evidence that consumer ignorance was a substantial cause of the crisis or that the existence of a CFPA could have prevented the problems that occurred.
More importantly, as will be discussed below, no such evidence could be produced because no such evidence exists.
Certainly there were incidents of fraud and abuse by lenders during the housing boom that led to subsequent problems and consumers who misunderstood their lending products. And certainly there also were incidents of fraud and abuse by borrowers who defrauded lenders. But there is no evidence that the financial crisis was spawned by a systematic lack of understanding by consumers of the loans into which they were entering. The consumer side of the financial crisis, by which I refer to problems of high levels of default (on mortgages and credit cards) and foreclosure (on mortgages), was caused not by consumer ignorance but misaligned incentives and rational consumer response to them.
It is true that lenders made a huge number of loans that were foolish in retrospect and perhaps should have been recognized as foolish at the time. And these unwise loans presented, and continue to present, major problems for the safety and soundness of the American banking sector. But these loans were foolish not because consumers did not understand them. They were foolish because lenders failed to appreciate the incentives that rational, fully-informed consumers would have to default on these loans if circumstances changed.
Consider an extreme, but not unrealistic scenario: a California borrower took a nothing-down, interest-only, adjustable-rate mortgage to buy a new home in the far-flung exurbs of Northern California, planning to live in the house for a few years and then resell it for a profit. Assume further that the borrower could continue to make his mortgage payment if he chose to do so. Instead, the house plunged in value so that it is worth much less than the outstanding mortgage and with widespread oversupply of housing there is no reasonable likelihood that it will come back above water in the near future. Under California's defaulter-friendly anti-deficiency laws the lender is limited to foreclosing on the house and cannot sue the borrower for the difference between the value of the house and the amount owed on the mortgage. As a result of all of this, the homeowner crunches the number, consults his lawyer, and decides to walk away from the house and allow foreclosure.
This scenario raises substantial concerns about the safety and soundness of such loans. One can ask whether banks should be permitted to make loans that provide such strong incentives for a borrower to default when the loan falls in value. In fact, empirical evidence suggests that many of the terms that have drawn much criticism (such as lowdocumentation loans) proved to be problematic only when combined with other provisions that reduced borrower equity, such as nothing-down. recent crisis as stripping equity out of ones' house makes it more likely that a price drop will push the house into negative equity territory thereby providing incentives to default on the loan.
Rather than recognizing the financial crisis as the product of misaligned incentives that has created major safety and soundness issues, the Obama Administration's proposal for a CFPA rests on the assumption that the financial crisis was produced by hapless consumer victims being exploited and defrauded by unscrupulous lenders. This misdiagnosis of the problem to be addressed has produced a proposal that is fraught with a risk of negative unintended consequences for consumers and which could actually exacerbate the structural incentives that produced the current crisis, thereby making such problems more likely rather than less likely in the future.
The proposal for a new CFPA is misguided for three reasons. First, it rests on misguided paternalism, and in so doing would likely prove counterproductive to consumer welfare overall. Second, by failing to recognize that the financial crisis primarily resulted from rational consumer responses to misaligned incentives (rather than failures of consumer protection) it offers solutions that could have the unintended consequence of exacerbating the very problems it purports to address, such as the issue of rising foreclosures. Third, by creating a new bureaucracy with defined scope, expertise, and mission, separate from other consumer protection agencies and safety and soundness regulators, it will promote the very bureaucratic balkanization and inconsistency that it aspires to address.
Misplaced Paternalism
The first problem with the CFPA is its basis in misplaced paternalism about consumers. As noted above, while there was undoubtedly fraud during the housing boom (both by borrowers and lenders) the problems that have been seen in the mortgage market are the result of rational consumer responses to incentives, not a problem of fraud or consumer confusion. The housing crisis-referring specifically to the problem of foreclosures-has little to do with the issues identified by the White Paper and thus an entity such as the CFPA would make little difference in averting a similar problem in the future.
The Mortgage Crisis
The initial wave of foreclosures was triggered by interest-rate resets on As can readily be seen, the initial surge in foreclosures for both prime and subprime mortgages were a manifestation of ARMs, not of subprime lending. In fact, foreclosure rates on fixed-rate subprime loans remained at relatively low levels. By contrast, in percentage terms, foreclosure rates on prime ARMs actually rose faster than for subprime ARMs (starting from a much lower base, of course). 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 9 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 9 1 / 1 / 1 9 8 3 1 / 1 / 1 9 8 5 1 / 1 / 1 9 8 7 1 / 1 / 1 9 8 9 1 / 1 / 1 9 9 1 1 / 1 / 1 9 9 3 1 / 1 / 1 9 9 5 1 / 1 / 1 9 9 7 1 / 1 / 1 9 9 9 1 / 1 / 2 0 0 1 1 / 1 / 2 0 0 3 1 / 1 / 2 0 0 5 1 / 1 / 2 0 0 7 1 / 1 / 2 0 0 9 It should be stressed in this context that economic research has overwhelmingly concluded that one factor that was not important were so-called "teaser rates" on subprime mortgages. A "hybrid" mortgage is one with an initial fixed interest rate at the beginning of the loan (usually for two or three years), often termed a "teaser" rate, followed by an adjustable rate for the duration of the loan with the rate set at some spread above an easily-established market rate (such as LIBOR). Critics have claimed that these hybrid mortgages were "exploding" mortgages in that the initial teaser rate was set excessively low and that there would be a dramatic upward shot in interest rates after the interest rate reset that would surprise borrowers with high interest rates and that this has helped to generate rising foreclosure rates. Although often-cited, this theory appears to lack any empirical foundation.
Percent
One estimate of subprime loans facing foreclosure in the early wave of foreclosures found that 36% were for hybrid loans, fixed-rate loans account for 31%, and from an initial rate of about 8 percent to about 11 percent a substantial adjustment, but not one that can fairly be characterized as "exploding." Moreover, mortgage interest rates generally were increasing during this period (the spread between the initial and reset rates generally narrowed during this period), so the higher rate on reset also might have reflected a general rise in ARM interest rates, not the hybrid nature of the loan.
Economists Anthony Pennington-Cross and Giang Ho find that the transition in a hybrid loan from an initial fixed period to the adjustable rate period results in heightened rates of prepayment but not default. 6 They also find that the termination rate for subprime hybrid loans (whether by prepayment or default) was comparable to that for prime hybrid loans.
Other studies documented a dramatic rise in early payment defaults, an absence of rising defaults at the time of interest-rate adjustments, a tendency toward prepayment rather than default around the time of reset, and a lack of evidence of "exploding" interest rates.
In light of these facts, economists have almost universally concluded that hybrid mortgages (at least alone) cannot explain the rise in foreclosures. After examining the evidence, several economists from the Boston Federal Reserve flatly stated last year, "Interest-rate resets are not the main problem in the subprime market." 7 I am aware of no evidence that contradicts that conclusion. Moreover, some apparently risky attributes of loans are also only potentially problematic when combined with other features of the mortgage regulatory regime.
Perhaps most important is the presence in several states of so-called antideficiency or "non-recourse" lending laws that limit the remedies available to lenders upon a borrower's default to foreclosure on the home without the right to sue the borrower personally for any remaining deficiency.
Empirical evidence indicates that foreclosure default and foreclosure rates are higher where law limits lender recourse through antideficiency laws. In a study of the neighboring provinces of Alberta and British Columbia in Canada, Lawrence Jones found that "in a period of sizable house-price declines, the prohibition of deficiency judgments can increase the incidence of default by two or three times over a period of several years."
9 Similarly-situated borrowers with negative home equity (that is, where they owe more than the value of the house) "will be observed defaulting in antideficiency antideficiency laws is also reflected in higher interest rates, thus increasing the risk of default for some marginal consumers as well.
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A recent study also found that antideficiency law produce increased foreclosures when home prices fall and that the effect is concentrated among wealthier homeowners with more expensive homes. 14 This differential impact is to be expected-wealthier homeowners would be expected to gain a greater benefit from a non-recourse law because they have more assets and income to seize in a lawsuit. Poorer homeowners, by contrast, are likely to have little wealth beyond the home itself. Thus, they gain little benefit from the protection of an antideficiency law.
This also suggests that in many situations the cause of foreclosure is the interaction of certain mortgage innovations (such as no-downpayment loans) with preexisting aspects of the legal environment (such as the presence of an antideficiency law Despite the lack of any evidence that the financial crisis was caused by overlycomplicated consumer financial products, the White Paper nonetheless recommends a radical revamp the entire market for consumer lending products. In particular, the White Paper contemplates that the CFPA would bless a category of "plain-vanilla" mortgages, credit cards, and other consumer credit products that would be provided with an elevated status. How the CFPA would make this determination is unclear from the White Paper as is the criteria that would need to be met to qualify.
In Europe, for instance, the standard mortgage product in many countries is a 10
or 15-year ARM with a balloon payment and no right to prepay. The CFPA, however, provides no criteria for deciding what the "right" premium a borrower should be forced to pay for a fixed-rate or a right to prepay. Traditionally-and correctly-the American regulatory system has not tried to make this choice for consumers, but instead to encourage disclosure to consumers so that they can make the best tradeoff of price and other contract terms that is suitable for their situation, budget, and level of risk tolerance. By elevating certain cookie-cutter "plain vanilla" loan products above others, the White Paper would instead seek to substitute its own biased assessment of the "appropriate" terms for a consumer, notwithstanding the fact that in doing so, the regulator would also be dramatically impacting the price that the borrower will have to pay for the loan as well. In so doing, the CFPA could very well force borrowers into more expensive loans that could turn out to be financially unsustainable or deny them the opportunity of home ownership, whereas a different loan with a different package of terms could have been more affordable and better-tailored to the borrowers' personal needs.
The premise that certain lending products can be classified as "risky" to borrowers is implicitly premised on the idea that the traditional American mortgage is not risky. That, of course, is simply incorrect. Principal is paid more slowly than for a shorter mortgage and equity accumulates more slowly. The mortgage interest rate includes a variety of risk premia in it, such as the risk of expected inflation rates, the risk that the borrower will prepay, and the risk of the change in the underlying value of the home as opposed to other investments. Thus, if inflation or market interest rates are lower than expected, then the borrower will have overpaid for the mortgage. If alternative investments (such as investing in the stock market) would have generated a greater return for the money spent on mortgage payments, then the risk of a fixed-rate mortgage is the foregone return on that money. These various risks associated with the traditional American mortgage may explain in part why efforts to introduce the traditional American mortgage have failed in other countries.
Credit Cards
With respect to credit cards, singled out for special criticism in the Obama Administration's White Paper (the "White Paper"), there is scant evidence that borrowers are unable to meaningfully understand their credit cards or shop effectively for credit cards. According to a survey by former Federal Reserve economist Thomas Durkin, 90%
of consumers report that they are "Very" or "Somewhat Satisfied" with their credit cards. 16 Durkin also found that two-thirds of credit card owners find it "very easy" or "somewhat easy" to find out information about their credit card terms, and only six percent believed that obtaining this information was "very difficult." Two-thirds of respondents also reported that credit card companies usually provide enough information to enable them to use credit cards wisely. In an ideal world, these figures might be even higher, but the White Paper does a great disservice to American consumers when it implies that consumers are unable comprehend their credit cards or to acquire the information that then need to make reasonable choices. Elevating certain "plain vanilla" loans for exalted status also poses a risk of chilling vigorous competition and innovation in lending products. Consider the dramatic innovations and improvements in credit cards over the past several decades. 19 Thirty years ago credit cards were an immensely simple product-a high annual fee, a high fixed interest-rate, and no benefits such as cash-back, frequent-flyer miles, purchase-price protection, etc. Bank cards were available only to a lucky few. The remainder of middleclass consumers who needed credit were forced to rely on credit from local department stores or appliance stores, thereby obliging them to shop at those stores. These cards were simple-but lousy. The simplicity and uniformity of pricing stifled innovation and, some have alleged, made it easier for credit card issuers to collude to fix prices and stifle competition.
The effective deregulation of the credit card market by the Supreme Court's decision in Marquette National Bank set off a process of competition and innovation that continues to this day. Annual fees have disappeared on all "plain vanilla" credit cards, remaining only for those cards that provide frequent flyer miles and the like. Virtually all credit cards have variable interest rates. And there is a much greater reliance on behaviorbased fees, such as over-the-limit fees, late fees, and the like. The combination of these innovations has resulted in more accurate risk-based pricing for cards and less crosssubsidization by low-risk users of higher-risk users of credit cards. True, credit card pricing has become more complicated-but that is largely because consumer use of credit cards is so much more complicated and varied than in the past.
More fundamentally, the deregulation of credit card terms eliminated arbitrary barriers to competition. Annual fees had been imposed by credit card issuers as a mechanism to evade state ceilings on interest rates. The elimination of those legislative price caps enabled interest rates to meet their market rates-but importantly, also led to the rapid elimination of annual fees. The presence of annual fees was very harmful to consumers because an annual fee acted a "tax" on consumers holding more than one credit card. Once a consumer paid his $40 annual fee, he was unlikely to switch to another card (and pay another annual fee) or to carry another card. This dramatically dampened competition. The elimination of annual fees enabled consumers to hold multiple credit cards, essentially forcing credit card issuers to compete every time the cardholder opens his wallet. Moreover, these cards compete on a number of different margins, permitting consumers to choose the best deal available to him at any given time.
It would be extremely unwise for a hypothetical CFPA to try elevate simplicity above all else without considering the impact of its actions on competition, innovation, and consumer choice. The parable of credit card innovation provides a warning lesson about a narrow fixation on simplicity.
Unintended Consequences
A second major problem with the concept of the CFPA is the high likelihood of unintended consequences that will result from its actions. to reinvest funds at lower market interest rates when interest rate falls. Where prepayment penalties are banned lenders also take other precautions to guard against the risk of prepayment, such as charging increased points or upfront fees at the time of the loan, which raise the initial cost of the loan.
Nor is there any evidence that prepayment penalties are excessively risky for consumers. Empirical evidence indicates that prepayment penalties do not increase the risk of borrower default. In fact, subprime loans that contain prepayment penalty clauses are less likely to default than those without such clauses, perhaps because of the lower interest rate on loans with prepayment penalties or perhaps because the acceptance of a prepayment penalty provides a valuable and accurate signal of the borrower's intentions. 21 Acceptance by a borrower of a prepayment penalty may also provide a credible signal by the borrower of his intent not to prepay the loan, thus overcoming an adverse selection in the marketplace and permitting a reduction in interest rates.
Borrowers obviously have greater knowledge than lenders about the relative likelihood that the borrower will prepay the mortgage, especially in the subprime market where prepayment tends to be highly idiosyncratic and borrower-specific.
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The White Paper's approach to prepayment penalties is also internally illogical,
stating that prepayment penalties "should be banned for certain types of products, such as subprime or nontraditional mortgages, or for all products, because the penalties make loans too complex for the least sophisticated consumers to shop effectively. statement is confused in two respects. First, it conflates two different concepts-the complexity of prepayment terms on one hand and the ability of consumers shop effectively on the other. If the concern is the ability to shop effectively, such as being able to compare competing offers, then the White Paper's concern could be met equally well by mandating prepayment penalties in every mortgage, thereby standardizing this term. In which case, it would no longer be a term on which consumers would need to compare across mortgages thereby rendering moot the question of the complexity of the term. Second, the statement refers to the inability of the "least sophisticated consumers"
to be able to shop effectively. According to research by the Federal Trade Commission, however, those who have subprime mortgages are just as capable of understanding their mortgage terms as prime borrowers (or more accurately, neither groups understands their loan terms very well). 24 In still other cases the White Paper fails to consider the sophistication of the covered group at all. For instance, it identifies negative amortization loans as being especially complex and subject to particular scrutiny. 25 Mayer et al., find that negative amortization and interest only loans were present in a significant minority of alt-A mortgages, but virtually nonexistent in subprime mortgages. 26 Yet although alt-A and subprime loans are often lumped together, there is reason to believe that many alt-A borrowers were highly-sophisticated borrowers who fully understood the risks of those products and alt-A mortgages were often used precisely to purchase larger and more underestimate the true increase in the LTV ratio if appraisals for refinance purposes were inflated (either intentionally or unintentionally), as appraisals are a less-accurate measure of value than actual sales. 29 The ability to freely prepay and refinance one's mortgage may help to explain the higher propensity for American consumers to default than in comparably-situated countries where prepayment is more difficult and thus cash-out refinancings are not as common.
This suggests that a ban or limitation on contractual agreements for prepayment penalties would encourage even more refinancing activity and further equity depletion that would otherwise be the case-thereby having the unintended consequence of increasing the number of foreclosures.
New restrictions on mortgage brokers would also likely be counterproductive for consumers. First, it should be noted that the fixation on the "yield-spread premium" for mortgage brokers is obviously misplaced: this is nothing more than the difference between the wholesale and retail cost of funds. Every loan from a depository lender also has an implicit yield-spread premium embedded in it.
More fundamentally, the White Paper's apparent hostility to mortgage brokers fundamentally misunderstands the nature of competition and consumer choice in this market. New regulations that might result in a reduction in the number of mortgage brokers, and thus an attenuation of competition, will likely result in harm to consumers.
Both economic theory and empirical evidence in this area strongly suggest that greater competition among mortgage brokers results in better loan terms for consumers.
Mortgage brokers are confronted with two distinct incentives. First, mortgage brokers have an incentive to maximize the "spread" between the rate at which they can acquire funds to lend to consumers (essentially the wholesale rate) and the rate at which they can lend to borrowers (the retail price). But second, mortgage brokers face competition from other brokers trying to get a borrower to borrow from them. The net result of these two factors-one pushing toward higher rates and one pushing toward lower rates-is ambiguous as an a priori matter.
Early studies have found various different results, some finding that brokers offer better terms on average than depository lenders and others finding that brokers charge higher prices on at least some elements of the transaction. 30 The explanation for these differing results appears to result from differences in the number of mortgage brokers competing in a given market.
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Where mortgage brokers are numerous and thus competition and consumer choice is greater, consumers generally receive lower interest rates from brokers (the competition effect predominates); but where there are a smaller number of brokers and less competition, consumers typically pay higher interest rates (the broker interest effect predominates). Empirical studies indicate that overlyrestrictive broker regulations may also lead to a higher number of foreclosures overall.
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The lesson seems to be clear-regulators should be wary of adopting overly-stringent regulations that will substantially reduce the number of mortgage brokers in a given market. Similar findings characterize many industries where overly-stringent regulations result in higher prices and other welfare losses for consumers.
Finally, any regulations imposed by the CFPA are likely to be a very blunt instrument for addressing the suitability of various lending products for consumers. "Low documentation" or "no documentation" mortgages (sometimes called "liar's loans") have also come in for criticism. As noted above, the performance of these mortgages has depended to some degree on whether they are refinance or purchase-money loans. Other researchers have found that low-documentation mortgages perform as well as other loans except when the loans combine other risk-increasing terms, such as no downpayment (a practice known as "risk-layering").
More generally, low-documentation loans appear to be extremely reasonable in some circumstances if not others. Low-documentation mortgages are safe and appropriate for many refinancing transactions, such as a borrower with a high credit score, a long track-record of timely payment and equity in his home. For such a borrower, a lowdocumentation loan may provide an opportunity to refinance at a lower interest rate without the substantial cost, delay, and inconvenience of a full-blown refinancing process that would add little valuable information. By contrast, a low-documentation loan makes little sense for a purchase-money loan to a new borrower with no equity in the home.
Prohibiting low-documentation loans in the former situation because of fear that it will be misused in the latter will raise the cost of refinancing for many borrowers and thereby make it more difficult for them to take advantage of lower interest rates. Even more importantly, questions regarding the proper role of low-documentation loans-whether refinance or purchase money-again raise safety and soundness issues, not consumer protection questions.
But this distinction between the appropriateness of low documentation loans in different contexts simply highlights a more fundamental problem: the CFPA's inability to engage in the sort of fine-grained regulatory analysis that is necessary to try to implement its charge. For instance, empirical studies have found dramatic differences in the performance of subprime loans with different terms depending on whether they are purchase-money or refinance. Economist Morgan Rose found, for instance, that while a three-year prepayment penalty is associated with a higher probability of foreclosure for purchase-money fixed-rate mortgages and refinance adjustable-rate mortgages, that same provision has no impact on increased foreclosures for refinance fixed-rate mortgages. 33 Danis and Pennington-Cross found that low documentation loans increase the probability of delinquency and the intensity of delinquency, but they decrease the probability of default and prepayment. 34 If this is true, which is the proper measure of the suitability of such a mortgage-the higher delinquency rate or the lower default rate?
More importantly, what matters is the suitability of the entire terms of a given loan as a whole, not the complexity or "riskiness" of particular terms standing alone. It is frankly absurd for regulators to try to single out particular terms standing alone as being inherently dangerous or inappropriately complex, noting that whether a particular term leads to a higher risk that a given loan will default depends very little on the presence of any given loan term but depends greatly on the type of loan-refinance versus purchasemoney, adjustable-rate versus fixed-and the presence of other non-traditional loan terms. Rose summarizes his findings, "In most instances, a given combination of loan features is associated with a greater increase in the predicted probability of foreclosure than the sum of the relevant individual loan feature impacts. For purchase FRMs with reduced documentation combined with either a long prepayment penalty period or a balloon payment (but not both), the reverse holds-those combinations are associated with substantial falls in the predicted probability of foreclosure beyond the sum of the relevant individual loan feature impacts."
As Rose concludes:
With regard to the implications of these results for potential federal predatory lending regulation, the overall pattern of results is of greater import than the individual estimates. That pattern illustrates that the magnitude, and even the direction, of the impact of a long prepayment penalty period, a balloon payment, or low-or no-documentation on the probability of foreclosure depends significantly on (a) the category of the loan under consideration, and (b) the presence or absence of the other two loan features. This suggests that relationships among predatory loan features and fore-closures are much more complex than previous analyses portray, casting doubt on regulators' and legislators' current ability to confidently discern abusive versus non-abusive lending. In particular, broad federal prohibitions or restrictions of these loan features that do not distinguish among loan categories, especially between refinances and purchases, and that do not recognize that loans with multiple loan features may require different treatment than loans with only one, are likely to be quite prone to causing unintended and undesired consequences.
Thus, even if we assume that these issues can be considered consumer protection issues rather than safety and soundness, it is absurd to think that a government bureaucracy can make the sorts of fine-grained distinctions to distinguish appropriate from inappropriate loans. To make data-based decisions a bureaucrat would have to know not only the identity and financial sophistication of the borrower, but also whether the loan is refinance or purchase-money and whether the combination of terms in the loan make the loan a likely candidate for default, because there is no sound evidence that particular terms standing alone can be thought of as inherently dangerous. This is not a serious proposition. And it illustrates precisely why the government has eschewed central planning of credit terms in the past-and should continue to do so.
Bureaucratic Inconsistency
A final problem with the CFPA is that it creates a new bureaucracy with a defined scope, expertise, and mission, separate from other consumer protection agencies and safety and soundness regulators. In so doing, it will promote the very bureaucratic balkanization and inconsistency that it aspires to address.
Of primary concern is the distinguishing of the CFPA's consumer protection mission from the Federal Reserve's safety and soundness regulatory authority. Under the White Paper's proposal, the CFPA would have authority to enforce regulations and impose substantial financial penalties. Inevitably, this power to impose financial penalties will threaten the financial condition of banks, thereby bringing the CFPA into conflict with the safety and soundness regulatory authority of the Federal Reserve.
The standard that the CFPA seeks to achieve is also unrealistic and suggests a Moreover, this standard fails to consider the question of which risks are relevant to be understood. For example, must those who enter into a fixed-rate mortgage understand that in doing so they are bearing the risk that market interest rates will fall, thereby forcing them to make higher payments than they would have with an ARM or to undergo a costly and inconvenient refinance process? For instance, during the low interest rate period of 2001-2004, those with fixed rate mortgages could have saved tens of thousands of dollars in lower interest rates if they had an ARM instead. 37 Must lenders insure that borrowers understand this "overpayment" risk? Must lenders make sure that borrowers understand that they pay a premium at the outset of a mortgage in order to have the right to prepay and refinance the mortgage later? What if the buyer only intends to own a given house for a few years?
Life, and credit, is full of risk: instead of acknowledging this, the CFPA apparently assumes away the existence of some sorts of risk, such as the risk of overpaying on a fixed-rate mortgage, and simply assumes that it is not actually a risk that Finally, the CFPA's limited substantive scope and responsibility is likely to cause it to undervalue the importance of competition and innovation in financial services. As noted above, the White Paper's emphasis on the value of simplicity in "plain vanilla"
financial products fails to appreciate the value of innovation and competition in financial 
